I. Introduction
Sometimes, the best way into a large subject is through a peripheral text. I choose a brief opening speech by Michel Albert, then President of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques, on the occasion of the bicentenary of the code civil in 2004. 1 In the beginning, Albert emphasizes the intrinsic Frenchness, of the Code civil with a familiar quote from Portalis : "Les lois … doivent être adaptées au caractère, aux habitudes, à la situation du people pour lequel elles sont faites". 2 In the end of the talk, just a few lines later, Albert turns around completely and .
praises the Code as a universal heritage: "le Code civil ne nous appartient pas à nous seuls Français -… il est une part de l'héritage de bien des nations".
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This ostensible inconsistency between a nationalist and an internationalist conception of the Code Napoléon is not a novelty. Napoleon himself pushed the Code civil as quintessentially French-and as the model for a European Code, of which he may have been the first proponent:
Pourquoi mon Code Napoléon n'eût-il pas servi de base à un Code européen…? De la sorte, nous n'eussions réellement, en Europe, composé qu'une seule et meme famille.
Chacun, envoyageant, n'eût pas cessé de se trouver chez lui." 4 The Code thus combines, since its beginning, two seemingly incompatible qualities: it is at the same time quintessentially French, and quintessentially European. In this article, I want to take a closer look at this strange dialectic of nationalist and internationalist conceptions of the French civil code. I think this dialectic is more complex and thus more interesting than the frequently invoked dichotomy between euroskepticism and europhilia-a dichotomy that seems to assume that the Europe to be loved or hated is a fixed entity, not an idea to be shaped. And I also think this dialectic suggests a more complex role that nationalism plays in the European private law project than as a mere barrier towards Europeanisation.
For a long time, studies on national resistance to Europe focused especially on
England and the common law. But the English opposition can easily (though perhaps falsely) be attributed to a clash of cultures or of styles, in particular civil versus common law, suggesting a European Code would be possible amongst the civil law countries. 5 The fierce French resistance against such a Code suggests that this is not so easy. 6 Its job is harder, however-it must contrast one Code (the Code civil) against another (the European). reason for the response. 23 Catala provides yet another military reference, this one quite stunning: it will not do to say that things are good enough as they are, because that was what the French on the eve of the desaster of 1940. 24 Hitler's invasion found the French unprepared; von Bar will find more resistance.
The aim is not just to protect the French code, however, but also to regain influence on Europe: 25 "Our hope is that the Reform Proposals serve the purpose which will
give France a civil law adapted to its time and a voice at the 
III. Cultural Images
In defending a French against a European Code, French critics invoke a number of arguments, but they can be grouped, roughly, under two headings: cultural, and political.
Among the cultural topics, the most frequent argument holds the culture of a French
Code against the lack of culture of a European Code. Closer analysis reveals that the opposite is argued as well: a European Code must be rejected precisely because it represents a culture.
Tradition versus Revolution
In one frequent juxtaposition, the French code is the fruit of tradition, while a European
Code would represent a break with traditions. Lequette recounts how generations of
French professors synthesized the principles of French law, until the code civil could be written in less than four months, based widely on the writings of Pothier 46 . Similarly, the Catala project starts with praise for Portalis and Carbonnier, both of whom "had the same perspective of history, a deep understanding of the customs and traditions which make up the 'spirit of the centuries' and the sense that 'it is right to save everything that it is not necessary to destroy". 47 As Portalis said, "The Codes of nations are the fruit of the passage of time; but properly speaking, we do not make them." The European code, this implies, is not just "étranger à la culture francaise," 48 but opposed to all culture: it has no tradition at all -the ius commune not withstanding. 49 The unity created by the French code had grown over centuries, while the unity created by a European code has not. 50 The European code project is thus an "utopie … sans racines historiques ni culturelles," 51 It breaks, in other words, with existing tradition. Again, however, this pair of images is found reversed. In the reversal, the French code civil itself overcame the "babel juridique" 61 of different laws and languages in France.
More, the Code Civil represents a universal language beyond France: Not only has the Code civil provided a model for numerous other codes; 62 , it has been translated numerous times. In the same vein, the Avant-Projet Catala was translated into six different languages to increase immediately its global reception. In this image, the strength of the Code Civil lies not in its close link to French language but rather in the universality of its language, its translatability. And now it is the European code, by contrast, that has its own peculiar language. In one way, this is the technical language of European bureaucracy -a language particular not to one specific country but to one group, and therefore not universal. Or, worse, the peculiar language of the European Code is
English-the language of a common law system! 63 In response to this universalism, the French no longer oppose a babel juridique; they now insist on linguistic pluralism (by which they mean: the use French in addition to English).
consciousness. 64 This emphasis on cultural values includes the law of contracts, which is cultural (and thus necessarily linked to the nation state.) 65 A European Civil Code, by contrast, has no spirit, no soul; it is "un syncrétisme juridique purement technique, sans racine, sans esprit et sans âme, de nulle part et de nulle époque" 66 Or, at best, it represents a cold economic rationality-like the common law, which the Doing Business Report appears to prefer, which (it is said) prioritizes efficiency over values. 
IV. Political Images
Related ideas concern not culture but politics. There is no doubt that the French Code civil is a political symbol, and a European Code would aim at the same role. Here, however, I want to focus only on political legitimacy. Legitimacy can refer to a code's internal legitimacy, and it can refer to external legitimacy towards other countries.
is viewed as an expression of democracy 70 There is, however, again a contrasting pair of images. In this contrasting pair, the French
Code stands for the genius not of democracy but of monarchy and imperialism.
Monarchism is present in the continued veneration of Napoléon Bonaparte's active role in the makin of the French Code. 78 Napoléon's famous quote, according to which his code will be the basis of his fame more than any military victories, is cited incessantly (though abridged). 79 The code is an imperial code, says Jean Foyer in admiration. 80 (It is also a professorial Code-the Avant-projet Catala, like the Lando Principles, was authored by self-appointed professors, not by public vote.) 81 And now the problem of the European Code is that it is not imperial enough. It is doubtful that the European project can succeed unless it is supported by "la magie, un charisme de géant." 82 Von Bar may be Pol Pot, but he is no Napoleon.
Self-Determination vs. Imperialism
Closely related is the idea that the French Code Civil is an emblem of national sovereignty and self-determination. France, we read, brought the idea of (national) 
Pluralism vs. Universality
A last pair of images is that of uniformity and pluralism. The Portalis quote mentioned in the introduction is a frequent reference in France: laws must be made differently for different peoples. 93 The French Code is inseparably linked to French identity -it is based on this identity and in turn contributes to this identity. The same is true in theory for other countries (even though French authors do not pay particular attention to those.) 94 And yet this is a strange flip of the old image of the French Code as universalist and antipluralist. 100 Portalis was the first to emphasize how the Code civil overcame regional identities:
Nous ne sommes plus Provençaux, Bretons, Alsaciens, mais Français … la loi est la mère commune des citoyens, elle leur accorde une égale protection à tous. 101 Lequette makes the same point in favor of nations, now against a Europe of Regions:
Les régions qui sont appelées à prendre la suite des nations se définissent, en effet, dans la conception allemande par une communauté, rélle ou plus ou moins fantasmatique, Code, as a mere collection of rules, could not achieve the same universal character.
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V. What to Make of all This
The main gist of all these arguments may seem obvious. Where a European Code threatens to replace the code civil with something different, it must be opposed. Where, by contrast, the code civil is allowed to become a European Code-whether directly, Inconsistency is not necessarily failure-it can, and often is, overcome by an act of faith. 115 George Fletcher once referred to the Code as one of three "nearly sacred books" of the Western legal tradition. 116 Indeed, its veneration has always had somewhat religious characteristics; 117 its support seems a matter not just of ratonality but of faith.
This matches not only Alain Supiot's suggestion for a religious basis of our modern law. 118 It is also in accordance with Ulrich Wehler's suggestion that nationalism has a quasi-religious element to it. 119 The French code civil, like the French nation, may once have been the essence of modernity. Against the conflicting modernity of the EU and a European Code, it is reinvented as a premodern artefact, worthy of protection just because it is there.
And yet, the frequent invocation of military metaphors are worrying. What we see is reminiscent of a religious war. Different sects within the same religion (the civil law)
